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THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA:  
HOW IN RE NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE  
LEVELS THE PLAYING FIELD 
JENNIFER HINDS* 
 
This Comment discusses renewed support for challenging the 
National College Athletic Association (NCAA) waivers that bar its student-
athletes from receiving compensation as unconscionable in light of the 
recent Ninth Circuit holding in In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and 
Licensing Litigation (In re NCAA Student-Athlete).  While critics 
previously debated whether the NCAA waivers are unconscionable, the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that student-athletes have a right to publicity 
strongly suggests that the waivers as they currently stand are no longer 
enforceable. 
Part II of this Comment provides a background on the NCAA waivers 
and Electronic Arts’s (EA) use of the student-athletes’ images in their 
videogames which lead to the suit.  Part III then analyzes the Ninth Circuit 
decision and finds that although the majority correctly denied EA’s anti-
SLAPP motion, it also should have considered the resulting effect that the 
holding would have on the NCAA waivers.  Part IV applies the doctrine of 
unconscionability to the NCAA waivers, and addresses various 
counterarguments.  Ultimately,  this Comment argues the NCAA waivers 
are procedurally unconscionable because the prospective student-athletes 
are unfairly surprised, and the student-athletes really have no meaningful 
choice to play elsewhere.  Also,  the NCAA waivers are substantively 
unconscionable because the NCAA and member schools retain the sole 
right to profit from the student-athletes’ likeness.  Part V concludes  by 
acknowledging that while unconscionability is still difficult to establish, In 
re NCAA Student-Athlete opened the door for student-athletes to 
successfully proceed by arguing that the clauses are unconscionable under  
contract law. 
                                                          
*J.D., Loyola Law School, 2014; Santa Clara University undergraduate and former NCAA 
student-athlete in Track and Field; 2014 J.D. Graduate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. I 
would like to thank Loyola Law Professors Bryan Hull and David Tunick for their ideas, 
mentorship, support, and guidance with this Comment. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“The fact remains—the NCAA is not exploiting current or former 
student-athletes, but instead providing enormous benefit to them and the 
public.”1  National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) chief legal 
officer Donald Remy made this statement in response to the intense public 
scrutiny the NCAA received from In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name and 
Licensing Litigation (“In re NCAA Student-Athlete”).2  He posited that In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete consisted of “baseless theories supported only by 
inaccurate speculation aimed at destroying amateurism in college 
athletics[.]”3 
Contrary to Remy’s claims: [c]ompetition takes many forms.4  
Although this case raised questions about athletic competition on the 
football field and the basketball court, it is principally about the rules 
governing competition in a different arena—namely, the marketplace.5 
In re NCAA Student-Athlete is a recent Ninth Circuit case concerning 
several former NCAA student-athletes who brought suit against Electronic 
Arts (“EA”) and the NCAA for using their likeness without compensating 
them.6  There, the Ninth Circuit denied EA’s anti-SLAPP motion, which 
allowed the case to go forward.7  Previously, the NCAA banned student-
athletes from receiving compensation in the name of amateurism.8  
Although the NCAA did not explain its definition of amateurism, the 
                                                          
1.  Patrick Vint, NCAA Comments on Ed O’Bannon Case in Middle of NFL Draft, SB 
NATION (Apr. 26, 2013, 8:30 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/4/26/4268 
324/ed-obannon-lawsuit-ncaa-statement.  
 
2.  Id.  
 
3.  Id.  
 
4.  Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n, No. 4:09-cv-03329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014), available at 
http://i.usatoday.net/sports/!Invesitgations-and-enterprise/OBANNONRULING.pdf.  
  
5.  Id.  
 
6.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 
1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 
7.  See id. at 1269.  
 
8.  See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-1967 CW, at 1-2; see also 
Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).  
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NCAA website claims that its Bylaws ensure that all its student-athletes 
compete on equal footing.9  Under these Bylaws, NCAA student-athletes 
are contractually barred from receiving any compensation, aside from 
scholarships, in relation to their participation in athletics.10  NCAA Bylaw 
12.5.2.1 specifically bans student-athletes from receiving any 
compensation related to publicity and personal promotion.11  Bylaw 
12.5.1.1.1 is even more restrictive in requiring student-athletes to 
contractually relinquish their right of publicity to the member schools and 
to the NCAA as a condition to participation in sports.12  Many NCAA 
student-athletes, sports commentators, and fans have questioned the 
fairness of this prohibition.13 
These NCAA restrictions have also spurred social commentary 
concerning whether the restrictions legitimize the exploitation of student-
athletes.14  For instance, the popular comedy show South Park ridiculed the 
NCAA Bylaws by comparing its exploitation of NCAA student-athletes to 
the exploitation of drug-addicted new born children, or “crack babies.”15  
                                                          
9.  See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct. 16, 2014).  
 
10.  C. Peter Goplerud III, Pay for Play for College Athletes: Now, More Than Ever, 38 S. 
TEX. L. REV. 1081, 1084-85 (1997); see NCAA Division I Manual: 2012-2013, NCAA, 60-65, 
available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/denv/genrel/auto_pdf/2013-
14/misc_non_event/compliance-manual-13.pdf; see generally Robert A. McCormick & Amy 
Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student-Athlete: The College Athlete as Employee, 81 
WASH. L. REV. 71 (2006).  
 
11.  NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, NCAA, 
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/samf/genrel/auto_pdf/Media_Internet_Sites.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2014); see In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
  
12.  See NCAA Division I Manual: 2012-2013, NCAA, 71, http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/sc 
hools/denv/genrel/auto_pdf/2013-14/misc_non_event/compliance-manual-13.pdf.  
 
13.  See Bloom v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 93 P.3d 621, 622 (Colo. App. 2004); 
Laura Freedman, Note, Pay or Play? The Jeremy Bloom Decision and NCAA Amateurism Rules, 
13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 673, 677 (2003); Matt Tracy, Johnny Manziel: 
Twitter Outrage from Fans Over NCAA Suspension, LATIN POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 11:18 AM), 
http://www.latinpost.com/articles/1777/20130829/johnny-manziel-twitter-outrage-fans-over-
ncaa-suspension.htm. 
 
14.  See, e.g., Jason Whitlock, True Reform Isn’t Part of NCAA’s Agenda, FOX SPORTS 
(June 6, 2014, 3:03 PM), http://www.foxsports.com/collegefootball/story/True-reform-
isn%2527t-part-of-NCAA-agenda-president-Mark-Emmert-081111. 
 
15.  South Park: Crack Baby Athletic Ass’n (Comedy Central television broadcast May 25, 
2011). Aptly titled Crack Baby Athletic Association, the episode likens the NCAA to the South 
Park characters masquerading as a non-profit organization that cuts a deal with EA Sports to sell 
the likeness of crack-addicted babies who fight each other for a crack-filled ball. Similar to the 
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Cartman, a central character on South Park who is known for his 
aggressive and prejudicial behavior, justifies his exploitation of the crack 
babies by stating: “the Crack Baby Athletic Association is a storied 
franchise.  It was founded over twelve days ago, with a firm ethical code 
that strictly states ‘benefits to players is detrimentalized [sic] to their well-
being.’”16  In stark contrast to the NCAA student-athletes, media and 
entertainment conglomerates such as ESPN, CBS, FOX, and EA pay the 
NCAA billions of dollars in annual revenue from licensing fees to 
broadcast live coverage of NCAA sporting events.17  The NCAA, in turn, 
distributes some of this revenue to its member schools.18 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ holding in In re NCAA Student-
Athlete demonstrates that the NCAA can no longer use amateurism to 
rationalize denying student-athletes just compensation for their 
misappropriated images.19  The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Northern 
District of California’s finding that NCAA student-athletes cannot 
contractually relinquish their right of publicity,20 and could sue EA for 
using their likenesses in its popular college sports videogames.21  While 
this lofty decision correctly allows student-athletes to bring 
misappropriation claims, the decision does not address the potential 
consequences of rendering the NCAA Bylaws unconscionable, and as such, 
unenforceable.22  While some commentators have previously argued that 
                                                          
NCAA’s treatment of student athletes, the South Park characters do not allow the babies to 
receive compensation. The episode also analogizes the NCAA restrictions to slavery, which is an 
extreme, albeit understandable, comparison. 
 
16.  Id.  
 
17.  See Richard T. Karcher, Broadcast Rights, Unjust Enrichment, and the Student-
Athlete, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 107, 108-09 (2012). 
 
18.  See id. at 108.  
 
19.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas J., dissenting); see 
generally Keller v. Elec. Arts, Inc., No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 530108, (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2010), aff'd sub nom. In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268. 
 
20.  See Keller, 2010 WL 530108, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010), aff'd sub nom. In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268. 
 
21.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1284.  
 
22.  See generally Nathan McCoy & Kerry Knox, Comment, Flexing Union Muscle—Is it 
the Right Game Plan for Revenue Generating Student-Athletes in Their Contest for Benefits 
Reform with the NCAA?, 69 TENN. L. REV. 1051 (2002). 
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the waivers are not unconscionable,23 the Ninth Circuit’s holding has 
opened the door for renewed arguments that the waivers are, in fact, 
unconscionable. 
This Comment will argue that the Ninth Circuit’s holding should have 
considered the underlying substantive concerns regarding the purpose of 
amateurism, and the holding’s potential effect on the current NCAA 
Bylaws.  Part II will discuss the background of the NCAA Bylaws and 
EA’s NCAA College Series videogames.  Part III will describe In re NCAA 
Student-Athlete, and examine the deficiencies of both the majority and 
dissenting opinions.  Part IV will address various counterarguments and 
argue that the waivers are unconscionable.  Part V will conclude by arguing 
that student-athletes can attack the waivers on the basis of their 
unconscionability. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section will provide background information about the NCAA 
Bylaws and EA’s NCAA College Series videogames to demonstrate how 
the NCAA wrongly profited off of its student-athletes that recently 
culminated in In re NCAA Student-Athlete. 
 
A. The NCAA Bylaws 
 
The NCAA is a nonprofit association comprised of over 1,200 
institutions, conferences, organizations, and individuals that organize the 
athletic programs of many U.S. colleges and universities.24  The NCAA, 
however, mandates that its athletic programs and the participating student-
athletes must be amateur.25  As previously mentioned, the NCAA itself 
does not explicate a definition of amateurism.26  However, the Oxford 
American Dictionary defines amateurism as “the views and principles of a 
person who engages in an activity for pleasure rather than profit.”27  The 
                                                          
23.  See generally Kendall K. Johnson, Note, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of 
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 1 (2012). 
 
24.  See Membership, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last 
visited Oct.16, 2014). 
 
25.  See Amateurism, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/amateurism (last visited Oct.16, 2014). 
 
26.  See generally id.  
 
27.  NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 48 (Angus Stevenson & Christine A. 
Lindberg eds., 3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added).   
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NCAA alleges that amateurism is “a bedrock principle of college athletics” 
and “crucial to preserving an academic environment in which acquiring a 
quality education is the first priority.”28  Thus, the NCAA ostensibly passed 
its Bylaws so that no college player would have an unfair advantage over 
others in an effort to promote education.29 
All prospective student-athletes must successfully receive amateurism 
certification from the NCAA Eligibility Center to participate in sports 
activities.30  Upon passing the certification process, many student-athletes 
also sign a National Letter of Intent, a binding agreement that the student-
athlete not only commits to playing sports at a specific university, but also 
commits to obeying the NCAA Bylaws.31  Many students are still minors 
when they sign a National Letter of Intent.32  The National Letter of Intent 
is a non-negotiable boilerplate contract that provides an ambiguous 
loophole for institutions to nullify the contract if the student-athlete does 
not meet the institution’s or the NCAA’s eligibility requirements.33  But, it 
does not provide the student-athletes with such a loophole if, for example, 
the coach who recruited the athlete is fired or takes another job.34  The 
irony is that a student-athlete’s amateurism status may be affected if he or 
she is represented by an agent while signing the contract; therefore, 
prospective student-athletes are expected to enter into these contracts only 
                                                          
 
28.  Amateurism, supra note 25. 
 
29.  See id. 
 
30.  See id. 
 
31.  See Debra D. Burke et al., The NCAA Letter of Intent: A Voidable Agreement for 
Minors?, 81 MISS. L.J. 265, 266-68 (2011) (arguing that individuals who signed NCAA Letters of 
Intent as minors should be able to later disaffirm such an agreement on ground of infancy); see 
also Orion Riggs, Note, The Façade of Amateurism: The Inequities of Major-College Athletics, 5 
KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 143 (1996). See generally Letter Becomes Null and Void, 
NATIONAL LETTER OF INTENT, http://www.nationalletter.org/nliProvisions/nullAndVoid.html 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2013). 
 
32.  See Burke et al., supra note 31. 
 
33.  Leo J. White, The National Letter of Intent Violates Doctrine of Unconscionability, 
CTS SPORTS LAW (Feb. 4, 2010), http://ctsportslaw.com/2010/02/04/the-national-letter-of-intent-
violates-doctrine-of-unconscionability/. 
 
34.  Id.; see generally Michael J. Riella, Note, Leveling the Playing Field: Applying the 
Doctrine of Unconscionability and Condition Precedent to Effectuate Student-Athlete Intent 
Under the National Letter of Intent, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2181, 2181-82 (2002). 
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on the advice of their often legally unsophisticated parents.35  In some 
situations, this may not constitute proper representation if their parents are 
unfamiliar with the contractual process.36  Even if a student-athlete does 
not sign a National Letter of Intent, he or she must still pass amateurism 
certification through the NCAA Eligibility Center and sign NCAA waivers 
where he or she agrees to follow the Bylaws in order to participate in 
sports.37 
All student-athletes must strictly adhere to the NCAA amateurism 
requirements to remain eligible for intercollegiate competition.38  If the 
NCAA determines that a student-athlete violated a rule that affects his or 
her eligibility, the NCAA can declare that student-athlete ineligible to 
participate in further athletic activities.39  One of the most controversial 
rules is NCAA Bylaw 12.5.2, which outlines non-permissible promotional 
activities for student-athletes once they pass the certification process.40  
Specifically, Bylaw 12.5.2.1 indicates that: 
 
[s]ubsequent to becoming a student-athlete, an individual shall 
not be eligible for participation in intercollegiate athletics if the 
individual: 
a. Accepts any remuneration for or permits the use of his or her 
                                                          
35.  See Amateurism, supra note 25; Staff Reporter, The Truth Behind the National Letter 
of Intent, NEON TOMMY (Apr. 29, 2010, 12:19 AM), http://www.neontommy.com/2010/04/nation 
al-letter-of-intent. 
 
36.  See, e.g., White, supra note 33. 
 
37.  Amateurism, supra note 25; see generally The Truth Behind the National Letter of 
Intent, NEON TOMMY (Apr. 29, 2010, 12:19 AM), http://www.neontommy.com/2010/04/national-
letter-of-intent (author explains that “[t]echnically, the National Letter of Intent is a voluntary 
program . . . .”). 
 
38.  See Amateurism, supra note 25; see also Dan Wetzel, Latest college scandals again 
reveal folly of NCAA rules, YAHOO SPORTS (Sept. 11, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://sports.yahoo.com/ 
news/ncaaf--latest-college-scandals-again-reveal-folly-of-ncaa-rules-210822795.html.  
 
39.  See Amateurism, supra note 25; see also Kent Sterling, After Long Illness, 
Amateurism in College Football Passes Away, KENT STERLING.COM (Sept. 12, 2013), 
http://kentsterling.com/2013/09/12/after-long-illness-amateurism-in-college-football-passes-
away/ (describes corruption in college football as undermining the purpose of amateurism). 
 
40.  NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, NCAA, 1-2, 
http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/samf/genrel/auto_pdf/Media_Internet_Sites.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 24, 2014); see generally Michael Rosenberg, NCAA Amateurism Rules Unfair, But Manziel 
Not One To Challenge Them, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 28, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-
football/2013/08/05/johnny-manziel-ncaa. 
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name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly 
the sale or use of a commercial product or service of any kind, 
or 
b. Receives remuneration for endorsing a commercial product 
or service through the individual’s use of such product or 
service.41 
 
Interestingly, student-athletes whose: 
 
[n]ame or picture appears on commercial items . . . or is used 
to promote a commercial product sold by an individual or 
agency without the student-athlete’s knowledge or permission, 
the student athlete (or the institution acting on behalf of the 
student-athlete) is required to take steps to stop such an 
activity in order to retain his or her eligibility for 
intercollegiate athletes.42 
 
However, the NCAA Bylaws interpret usage of a student-athlete’s 
name and/or photo in a magazine or newspaper as exempt from the non-
permissible activity rule.43  Indeed, student-athletes are contractually bound 
to refrain from participating in promotional activities, but must also try to 
ensure that no one is wrongfully using their likeness.44  In short, even if a 
student-athlete wished to license his or her image, he or she could not do so 
without potentially destroying his or her amateur status and rendering 
                                                          
41.  NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, supra note 40; see Hart v. Elec. 
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 n.3 (3d Cir. 2013) (“NCAA bylaws limit college athletes . . . to 
receiving only non-athletic financial aid . . . which cover only tuition and various school-related 
expenses.”). 
 
42.  NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, supra note 40 at 2. (emphasis 
added). 
 
43.  Id. 
 
44.  Talor Bearman, Note, Intercepting Licensing Rights: Why College Athletes Need a 
Federal Right of Publicity, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 85, 105 (2013) (discussing that the 
student athlete must sign a contract allowing his or her name and picture be used by the NCAA, 
the university he or she attends, and to the university’s athletic conference, but the athlete cannot 
profit from his or her likeness without losing the ability to participate in NCAA athletic events); 
see generally Regulation of Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices in Connection Between an 
Athlete Agent and a Student Athlete, 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2004). 
 
THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2015  1:58 PM 
2014] THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA 103 
himself or herself ineligible to participate in college sports.45  Moreover, 
under this strict standard, even if a student-athlete’s likeness is being used 
without consent or knowledge, his or her amateur status will potentially be 
destroyed if he or she does not take adequate steps to curb the activity.46 
Student-athletes are required to sign forms in order to participate in an 
NCAA sport.47  For example, by signing Form 08–3a, student-athletes 
agree to the following: “You authorize the NCAA [or a third party acting 
on behalf of the NCAA (e.g., host institution, conference, local organizing 
committee)] to use your name or picture to generally promote NCAA 
championships or other NCAA events, activities, or programs.”48  Finally, 
in addition to Form 08-3a, student-athletes must observe NCAA Bylaw 
Article 12.5.1.1, which provides: 
 
A member institution or recognized entity thereof (e.g., 
fraternity, sorority or student government organization), a 
member conference or a non-institutional charitable, 
educational or nonprofit agency may use a student-athlete’s 
name, picture or appearance to support its charitable or 
educational activities or to support activities considered 
incidental to the student-athlete’s participation in intercollegiate 
athletics, provided the following conditions are met . . .49 
 
Thus, not only are student-athletes unable to profit from their 
likenesses in any way, they also must contractually relinquish their rights 
of publicity to the NCAA and member schools, which allows both entities 
to profit off of their success.50 
                                                          
45.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also 
Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, J.J. Morrison and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 
15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 241, 277 (2008) (arguing that the NCAA agreement with student 
athletes constitutes an unconscionable adhesion contract). 
 
46.  NCAA Rules – Media and Private Internet Websites, supra note 40 (informational 
articles and accompanying images of the student-athlete in a magazine or newspaper are excepted 
as would be a television station’s broadcast of the event or its news coverage of the event in the 
public domain). 
 
47.  Order on NCAA’s and CLC’s Motions to Dismiss at *2-3, O'Bannon v. Nat'l 
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
 
48.  Id. 
 
49.  Id. 
 
50.  However, the 2014 form does not include the language “you authorize the NCAA” 
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The right of publicity, which has been referred to in connection with 
the right of privacy, is defined as the right of an individual to control any 
commercial use of his or her name, image, likeness, or some other 
identifying aspect of identity.51  This right, however, is subject to First 
Amendment implications.52  Generally, an individual can receive 
compensation for commercial use of his or her likeness because of its 
inherent economic value.53  However, the above referenced Bylaws and 
agreements essentially mean that student-athletes have no right of publicity 
because they give the NCAA the sole ability to profit off their student-
athlete’s images.54 
Of course, the NCAA claims that it bars student-athletes from 
receiving compensation in the name of amateurism.55  Nevertheless, the 
NCAA fails to address how amateurism is preserved, for example, by not 
compensating a student-athlete for using his or her image on a brochure to 
promote ticket sales.56  The NCAA also fails to address how amateurism is 
preserved by using a student-athlete’s name on a jersey.57  Additionally, the 
NCAA licenses many student-athletic activities in exchange for 
compensation and use of its logos.58  In fact, the NCAA received revenues 
                                                          
that was included in forms for previous years. See generally Student-Athlete Statement—NCAA 
Division I, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Form%2014-3a%20-
%20Student-Athlete%20Statement_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 
51.  Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 967 (10th Cir. 
1996); see Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gums, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953); 
see also Bearman, supra note 44. 
 
52.  See generally Cardtoons, 95 F.3d 959. 
 
53.  See generally id. 
 
54.  See 15 U.S.C. § 7802 (2012). 
 
55.  15 U.S.C. § 7802; see Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1, O'Bannon v. 
Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 4:09-cv-03329-CW (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014), available at 
http://i.usatoday.net/sports/!Invesitgations-and-enterprise/OBANNONRULING.pdf; Bearman, 
supra note 44. 
 
56.  See Allie Grasgreen, Opining on O’Bannon, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 23, 2013), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/04/23/experts-weigh-possible-outcomes-effects-ncaa-
likeness-lawsuit. 
 
57.  See id. 
 
58.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas J., dissenting); 
NCAA Will Not Renew EA Sports Contract, NCAA (July 17, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-will-not-renew-ea-sports-
contract. 
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of $871.6 million in the fiscal year 2011-2012, with 81% of the money 
coming from television and marketing fees.59  One controversial licensing 
agreement is the NCAA’s licensing agreement with EA, which has 
intensified the debate concerning both the NCAA Bylaws’ ban on student-
athletes receiving compensation and EA using the student-athletes’ images 
without compensating them.60 
 
B. EA Sports’ NCAA Football and Basketball Series 
 
In 2010, popular videogame distributor EA was the world’s third-
largest gaming company, in terms of revenue, after Nintendo and 
Activision Blizzard.61  EA created EA Sports in 1991 for the sole purpose 
of marketing its sports-themed videogames.62  The brand soon evolved into 
its own lucrative sub-label and began releasing college-sports themed 
videogames, including the NCAA Football and NCAA Basketball series.63  
Although EA discontinued its NCAA Basketball franchise in 2010 because 
of declining sales, its NCAA Football series has continued to be quite 
popular.64  Until June 2014, EA had a licensing agreement with the NCAA 
to use its logos in EA Sports’ video games in exchange for paying the 
NCAA a portion of their revenue.65  Additionally, EA currently has a 
                                                          
59.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 n.5 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas J., 
dissenting). 
 
60.  NCAA Will Not Renew EA Sports Contract, NCAA (July 17, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaa-will-not-renew-ea-sports-
contract; see also Rachel Axon & Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Spokesman: ‘Suit Threatens College 
Sports as We Know It’, USA TODAY SPORTS (July 19, 2013, 7:28 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/07/19/ncaa-ea-lawsuit-jake-fischer-jake-smith-
darius-robinson-chase-garnham-moses-alipate-victor-keise/2569615/. 
 
61.  Top 25 Gaming Companies 2010, SOFTWARE TOP 100 (August 3, 2010, 7:45 AM), 
http://archive.today/IXy2Y. 
 
62.  Electronic Arts Inc. History, FUNDINGUNIVERSE, 
http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/electronic-arts-inc-history/ (last visited Oct 
24, 2014). 
 
63.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271-1272 n.2 (9th Cir. 2013); 
pastapadre, NCAA Basketball Series Officially Canceled, PASTAPADRE (Feb. 10, 2010, 11:02 
AM), http://www.pastapadre.com/2010/02/10/ncaa-basketball-series-officially-canceled#more-
$id. 
64.  See Eamonn Brennan, No College Hoops Video Game? Bummer, ESPN (Sept. 21, 
2010, 9:52 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/collegebasketballnation/post/_/id/15506/no-college-
hoops-video-game-bummer.  
 
65.  See generally NCAA, supra note 60. 
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license with the College Licensing Company (“CLC”), the NCAA’s 
licensing agent, to use member school names, team names, uniforms, logos, 
stadium fight songs, and other game elements.66  Because of this licensing 
agreement, member schools also receive a portion of the revenue generated 
from CLC’s contract with EA.67 
Clearly, EA owes much of the success of its NCAA Football franchise 
to EA’s focus on realism and detail—including the realistic sounds, game 
mechanics and team mascots—by creating virtual versions of actual 
stadiums, populating the stadiums with virtual athletes, coaches, 
cheerleaders, and fans realistically rendered by EA’s graphic artists, and 
incorporating sounds such as the crunch of the players’ pads and the roar of 
the crowd.68 
In fact, the EA Sports Blog stated that “[e]ach year, NCAA Football 
playbook designer Anthony White strives to make each team’s playbook 
accurately represent their system and play style . . . [E]ach year, Anthony 
adds in actual plays run by teams that can only be found in specific 
playbooks.”69  To accomplish this, EA attempts to match any “unique, 
highly identifiable playing behaviors by sending detailed questionnaires to 
team equipment managers.”70  However, EA purports not to use the exact 
likeness of the players in their NCAA Football series, citing NCAA Bylaw 
12.5’s restriction on athletes receiving remuneration from any publicity and 
the student-athlete’s surrender of their right of publicity.71  Thus, unlike its 
other sports videogame franchises, such as the Madden NFL Series, EA 
does not license the likeness and identity rights for intercollegiate players.72  
                                                          
66.  See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
67.  See generally Andy Staples, Ed O’Bannon v. the NCAA: A Complete Case Primer, 
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.si.com/college-football/2013/04/02/ed-
obannon-ncaa-case-primer. 
 
68.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 146. 
 
69.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 n.6. 
 
70.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271. 
 
71.  See Student-Athlete Likeness Lawsuit Timeline, NCAA (Dec. 12, 2013, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/student-athlete-likeness-
lawsuit-timeline (stating that the NCAA’s agreement with EA “clearly prohibits the use of names 
and pictures of current student-athletes in [EA’s] electronic games”); Kanika Corley, Are 
Videogame Manufacturers Permitted to Use Your Image for their Own Monetary Benefit, Without 
Your Consent? Well, it depends . . ., ACCESS ATHLETES (June 22, 2013, 4:51 PM), 
http://www.accessathletes.com/blog/keyword.cfm?keyword=%22EA%20Locker%22.  
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In fact, EA omits the intercollegiate players’ names from their jerseys, and 
assigns each player a different hometown than the player’s actual 
hometown.73 
While EA claims the virtual players in the game do not represent real 
life players, the videogame characters are truly representative of the actual 
players’ positions, teams, heights, home states, and ethnicities.74  NCAA 
college football fans would definitely recognize their favorite players.75  
For example, Alabama Crimson Tide fans can clearly recognize the 
Alabama Crimson Tide Player Quarterback #10 character in NCAA 
Football 2013 as corresponding to Alabama Crimson Tide quarterback AJ 
McCarron in position, team, height, home state and ethnicity.76 
Moreover, the game allows amateur roster makers to manually 
associate the actual players’ names and upload a roster file to a built-in 
roster sharing system, like the EA Locker Feature, which permits remote 
roster sharing online through Xbox Live or PlayStation Network.77  The 
Ninth Circuit states, “[u]sers can further alter reality in the game by 
entering ‘Dynasty’ mode, where the user assumes a head coach’s 
responsibilities for a college program for up to thirty seasons including 
players from a randomly generated pool of high school athletes.”78  Users 
                                                          
72.  See Craig Powers, NCAA Abandons EA Sports License, but the CLC Ensures a 
Realistic Future College Football Game, SB NATION (July 17, 2013, 3:20 PM), 
http://www.cougcenter.com/wsu-cougars-football/2013/7/17/4533022/ncaa-14-15-EA-sports-
licensing-clc-license; Samit Sarkar, NFL Licensing Deals for Madden Series Haven’t Expired, 
Says EA, POLYGON.COM (Jan. 28, 2014, 6:24 PM), http://www.polygon.com/2014/1/28/5355462 
/ea-madden-nfl-licensing-deals-havent-expired.   
 
73.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271.  But see Hart, 717 F.3d at 146. 
 
74.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271; see also Adam Ramirez, EA Sports 
Used Ex-NCAA Athletes’ Likeness Without Permission: 9th Cir., FINDLAW (July 31, 2013, 12:49 
PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/courtside/2013/07/ea-sports-used-ex-ncaa-athletes-likeness-
without-permission-9th-cir.html. 
 
75.  See generally Ramirez, supra note 74.  
 
76.  See generally Jack Kerwin, Alabama Crimson Tide News: Time To Recognize AJ 
McCarron, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/sportsnet/alab 
ama-crimson-tide-news-time-recognize-aj-mccarron-857037; Tony Breland, AJ McCarron No. 4 
Rated Player in EA Sports NCAA Football ’14, BAMAHAMMER.COM, http://bamahammer.com/20 
13/06/11/aj-mccarron-no-4-rated-player-in-ea-sports-ncaa-football-14/#!bTix89 (last visited Oct. 
24, 2014).  
 
77.  Corley, supra note 71; PS3/Xbox 360 NCAA Football 14 EA Locker Download 
Directions, GAME ROSTERS, http://www.gamerosters.com/2014.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 
78.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1271-72. 
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can also use “Campus Legend” mode to control a “virtual player from high 
school through college, making choices related to practices, academics, and 
social life.”79  Thus, even though EA personally did not publish the names 
of the student-athletes, it gives videogame players the ability to do so, 
allowing users to associate the video game figures to the players.  
Therefore, EA intentionally tried to emulate the players by making their 
game as realistic as possible.80  As a result of this obvious appropriation, 
EA has been named a party in many controversial lawsuits, the most recent 
of which reached the Ninth Circuit in In re NCAA Student-Athlete.81  
Because of the legal uncertainty surrounding the issue, EA has 
discontinued the game despite its incredible popularity.82  This is obviously 
a negative consequence because it prevents consumers from playing 
popular games.  However, this situation could have been prevented had EA 
decided to compensate the former student-athletes as it does for its Madden 
NFL Series.83 
III. IN RE NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETE NAME &  
LIKENESS LICENSING LITIGATION: THE SIGNIFICANT DECISION 
This section will discuss the seminal case In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
by summarizing the factual and procedural background of the case and 
analyzing the majority and the dissent. 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
 Samuel Keller (“Keller”) was a starting quarterback at Arizona State 
University (“ASU”) in 2005, and later transferred to the University of 
Nebraska (“Nebraska”), where he played during the 2007 football season.84  
                                                          
79.  Id. at 1272. 
 
80.  See id. at 1271. 
 
81.  See id. at 1268; see also Hart, 717 F.3d at 145. 
 
82.  Dave Singleton, EA Sports to Discontinue NCAA Football Game, BLOGUIN (Sept. 27, 
2013, 3:21 PM), http://www.bloguin.com/crystalballrun/2013-articles/september/ea-sports-to-
discontinue-ncaa-football-game.html. 
 
83.  See Curt Feldman & Tim Surette, Big Deal: EA and NFL Ink Exclusive Licensing 
Agreement, GAMESPOT (Dec. 13, 2004), http://www.gamespot.com/articles/big-deal-ea-and-nfl-
ink-exclusive-licensing-agreement/1100-6114977/.   
 
84.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 
(9th Cir. 2013). 
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In order to participate in NCAA sports at both ASU and Nebraska, Keller 
signed waivers agreeing to abide by the NCAA’s Bylaws to maintain his 
amateur status.85 
In the 2005 edition of EA’s NCAA Football Series, the virtual starting 
quarterback from ASU wore the same number as Keller, number 9, and 
also had the same height, weight, skin tone, hair color, hair style, 
handedness, home state, play style, visor preference, facial features, and 
school year.86  In 2007, Keller transferred to Nebraska.87  When EA Sports 
came out with the 2008 edition of the game, the virtual quarterback from 
Nebraska had the exact same characteristics as the 2005 virtual starting 
quarterback from ASU, except for the jersey number.88  The Ninth Circuit 
attributed this jersey number deviation to Keller changing his jersey 
number right before the start of the 2008 season.89 
Ed O’Bannon also competed as an NCAA student-athlete for the 
University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”).90  He was a member of 
the UCLA Men’s Basketball team from 1991 to 1995,91 a starter on 
UCLA’s 1995 Championship team, and the 1995 NCAA Basketball 
Tournament’s Most Outstanding Player.92  Similar to Keller, O’Bannon 
was a star member of the team and participated pursuant to the rules and 
regulations of the NCAA, specifically NCAA Bylaw Articles 12.5.1 and 
                                                          
85.  See id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 
86.  Id. at 1272. 
 
87.  Id. at 1271. 
 
88.  Id. at 1272. 
 
89.  Id. 
 
90.  O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-1967 CW, 2010 WL 445190, 
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 2010). 
 
91.  Id.; see also Karen Gullo and Matt Levenson, Ex-NCAA Quarterback Sues Electronic 
Arts Over Games (Update 2), BLOOMBERG (May 6, 2009, 6:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aE3SJ3nIciB8&refer=us. 
 
92.  Steve Eder & Ben Strauss, Understanding Ed O’Bannon’s Suit Against the N.C.A.A., 
N.Y. TIMES (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/10/sports/ncaabasketball/understanding-ed-obannons-suit-
against-the-ncaa.html; see Hilary Russ, Athletes’ Licensing Fight Survives NCAA’s Bid to Toss, 
LAW360 (Feb. 8, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/148446/athletes-licensing-
fight-survives-ncaa-s-bid-to-toss. 
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12.5.2.1.93  O’Bannon also alleges that EA misappropriated his image by 
using his likeness and the same stats for his character (as EA did with 
Keller’s character) in the 1995 edition of their now defunct NCAA 
Basketball Series.94 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
On May 5, 2009, Keller filed a putative class action lawsuit in the 
Northern District of California against EA Sports and the NCAA, claiming 
misappropriation of student-athletes’ images that were used in the NCAA 
Football and NCAA Basketball series.95  He also claimed that EA and the 
NCAA violated his right of publicity under California Civil Code § 3344 
and California common law.96  On July 21, 2009, Ed O’Bannon also filed a 
lawsuit against the NCAA and the CLC in the Northern District of 
California, alleging that NCAA waivers violated the Sherman Act and 
wrongly deprived him of his right of publicity.97  On September 1, 2009, 
Keller and O’Bannon moved to consolidate their cases; the district court 
granted these motions to consolidate all related actions on January 15, 
2010.98 
EA, the NCAA and the CLC collectively moved to dismiss Keller’s 
Complaint; EA also moved separately to strike the Complaint and dismiss 
the action as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (“SLAPP”) 
                                                          
93.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Litig., C 09-1967 CW, 2011 WL 
1642256, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2011); In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 
(Thomas, J., dissenting).  
 
94.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 2011 WL 1642256, at *3. 
 
95.  Complaint, Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 3:09-CV-01967, 2009 WL 1270069 (N.D. 
Cal. May 5, 2009). 
 
96.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1272. 
 
97.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 2011 WL 1642256, at *4; see also Kurt Streeter, Former 
UCLA Star Ed O’Bannon Leads Suit Against NCAA Over Use of Images, L.A. TIMES (July 22, 
2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/22/sports/sp-videogames-lawsuit22; Jon Solomon, 
Timeline: Ed O’Bannon vs. NCAA, CBS SPORTS (June 6, 2014, 9:58 AM), http://www.cbssports. 
com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24581878/timeline-ed-obannon-v-ncaa. 
 
98.  Plaintiffs Samuel Michael Keller’s and Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr.’s Notice of Joint 
Motion and Motion to Consolidate Actions, Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 4:09-cv01967-CW, 
2009 WL 2920919 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009); Order Granting Plaintiffs Samuel Michael Keller’s 
and Edward C. O’Bannon, Jr.’s Joint Motion to Consolidate Actions, Keller v. Electronic Arts, 
Inc., 4:09-cv-01967-CW (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2010). 
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under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, California Code of Civil Procedure 
§ 425.16.99  The anti-SLAPP motion under California law provides for a 
special motion that a defendant can file at the outset of a lawsuit to strike a 
complaint when it arises out of conduct that falls within the protection of 
the First Amendment.100  The anti-SLAPP law is designed to prevent 
people from trying to chill free speech rights by suing people who are 
exercising these rights.101  In this case, EA argued that they were exercising 
their First Amendment right to free speech when they used the student-
athletes’ likenesses in the game.102  If EA had successfully established that 
they were attempting to exercise their First Amendment rights, the burden 
would have shifted to the plaintiffs to show that they would likely succeed 
on the merits, meaning that the speech was not protected.103  The district 
court denied the anti-SLAPP motion because they found that the plaintiffs 
had established that they would likely succeed on the merits.104  EA 
appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.105 
On appeal, EA raised four affirmative First Amendment defenses 
under the anti-SLAPP motion that would have immunized them from any 
liability to the student-athletes: the “‘transformative use’ test, the Rogers 
test, the ‘public interest’ test, and the ‘public affairs’ exemption.”106  EA 
also argued that even if their First Amendment defenses failed, NCAA 
student-athletes have no right of publicity because, pursuant to NCAA 
Bylaws, they contractually assigned their right of publicity to the NCAA 
and its member schools, and thus, the Bylaws prohibited them from 
receiving compensation.107 
                                                          
99.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1272. 
  
100.  See generally CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2014). 
 
101.  Platypus Wear, Inc. v. Goldberg, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 95, 103 (Ct. App. 2008) (stating 
that the policy reasoning behind anti-SLAPP law was to prevent the chilling of First Amendment 
free speech rights). 
102.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1273. 
  
103.  See generally CIV. PROC. § 425.16. 
 
104.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1279.  
 
105.  See id. at 1272. 
 
106.  Id. at 1273. 
 
107.  See id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s decision and 
held that EA’s affirmative defenses did not trump the plaintiffs’ right of 
publicity claims.108  Importantly, the court’s denial of EA’s anti-SLAPP 
motion arguably demonstrates that Keller, O’Bannon, and the other 
student-athletes would probably succeed on the merits in proving that EA’s 
conduct fell outside of First Amendment protection because EA violated 
the student-athletes’ right of publicity.  Consequently, the majority did not 
address EA’s defense on the basis of the NCAA waivers.109  In fact, that 
component was not addressed in  O’Bannon antitrust action.110 
Judge Thomas strongly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s holding.111  
While the dissent was primarily concerned with the belief that EA satisfied 
the transformative use doctrines, the dissent also addressed the NCAA 
waivers by stating: 
 
Finally, as a qualitative matter, the publicity rights of college 
athletes are remarkably restricted. This consideration is critical 
because the “right to exploit commercially one’s celebrity is 
primarily an economic right.”  NCAA rules prohibit athletes 
from benefitting economically from any success on the field.  
NCAA Bylaw 12.5 specifically prohibits commercial licensing 
of an NCAA athlete’s name or picture.  Before being allowed to 
compete each year, all Division I NCAA athletes must sign a 
contract stating that they understand the prohibition on licensing 
and affirming that they have not violated any amateurism rules.  
In short, even if an athlete wished to license his image to EA, 
the athlete could not do so without destroying amateur status.  
Thus, an individual college athlete’s right of publicity is 
extraordinarily circumscribed and, in practical reality, 
                                                          
108.  See id. at 1284. 
 
109.  See id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 
110.  Steve Berkowitz, Judge Releases Ruling on O'Bannon Case:  NCAA Loses, USA 
TODAY (Aug. 8, 2014, 11:29 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/08/08/ed-
obannon-antitrust-lawsuit-vs-ncaa/13801277/; see generally John Solomon, EA and CLC Settle 
Lawsuit by Ed O’Bannon Plaintiffs; NCAA Remains As Lone Defendant; AL.COM (Sept. 28, 
2013, 3:37 PM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2013/09/ea_will_not_make_college_footb.ht 
ml.  
 
111.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1290 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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nonexistent.112 
 
The dissent also argued that the majority mistakenly equated the right 
of publicity for student-athletes with that of professional athletes, because 
the, “marketing power of [professional NFL athletes] is well established, 
while that of the plaintiffs [student-athletes] is not.”113 
On September 26, 2013, EA and CLC settled all of the claims brought 
against them.114  The terms of the settlement will remain confidential until 
presented to the district court for preliminary approval.115  However, both 
the plaintiffs and the NCAA have publicly stated that this settlement “does 
not affect Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendant National Collegiate Athletic 
Association.”116  The NCAA publicly announced that they would fight the 
suits all the way to the United States Supreme Court if need be.117  On 
appeal, the NCAA’s motion to dismiss the O’Bannon antitrust suit was 
denied.118  While this denial was expected, it inevitably guarantees many 
years of continued litigation.119  The District Court had also certified the 
                                                          
112.  Id. at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 1289, 
n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the equity behind the structure of NCAA 
athletes is an issue, but believing that it is beyond the scope of appeal). 
 
113.  See id. at 1288, n. 4; Vladimir P. Belo, Note, The Shirts Off Their Backs:  Colleges 
Getting Away With Violating the Right of Publicity, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 133, 134 
(1996) (“The universities have begun licensing products that seek to capitalize on the popularity 
of actual players in addition to the popularity of the schools and their athletic teams.”); see 
generally William D. Holthaus, Jr., Note, Ed O'Bannon v. NCAA:  Do Former NCAA Athletes 
Have A Case Against the NCAA for Its Use of Their Likenesses?, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 369 
(2010); LOUIS ALTMAN & MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR. & MONO. § 
22:32 (4th ed. 2012). 
 
114.  See generally Solomon, supra note 110.  
 
115.  See Steve Eder, E.A. Sports Settles Lawsuit with College Athletes, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/sports/ncaafootball/ea-sports-wont-make-college-
video-game-in-2014.html?_r=0; see generally Solomon, supra note 110. 
 
116.  Solomon, supra note 110. 
 
117.  Patrick Vint, O’Bannon vs. the NCAA:  The EA Settlement Means TV Money is Now 
the Battle, SB NATION (Sept. 27, 2013, 9:11 AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/201 
3/9/27/4775712/obannon-ncaa-ea-settlement-clc. 
 
118.  See Tom Farrey, NCAA Motion Denied in Player Suit, ESPN (Nov. 5, 2013, 6:01 
PM), http://espn.go.com/espn/otl/story/_/id/9879455/judge-denies-motion-dismiss-ed-obannon-
ncaa-lawsuit.  
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O’Bannon lawsuit as a class-action, but with a significant catch: while 
current and former NCAA athletes can challenge the NCAA restrictions on 
athlete compensation, the class is certified for “purposes of injunctive relief 
only,” meaning the student-athletes can legally “prevent the N.C.A.A. from 
acting the same way in the future, but not for damages.”120 
The trial began on June 9, 2014, in District Court.121  The trial 
concluded on June 27, 2014, with each side submitting final written closing 
statements to Judge Wilken by July 10, 2014.122  On August 8, 2014, Judge 
Wilken released a 99-page ruling in favor of the plaintiffs.123 The ruling 
issued an injunction that prohibits the NCAA from “enforcing any rules or 
bylaws that would prohibit its member schools and conferences from 
offering their FBS football or Division I basketball recruits a limited share 
of the revenue generated from the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses in addition to a full grant in aid.”124 
While the ruling theoretically could have enabled football and men’s 
basketball programs to receive more aid from schools than they are 
receiving now, possibly at the expense of other programs, the judge limited 
the ruling by not allowing athletes to receive money for the endorsements 
and saying, “[a]llowing student-athletes to endorse commercial products 
would undermine the efforts of both the NCAA and its member schools to 
protect against the ‘commercial exploitation’ of student-athletes.”125  While 
the injunction will not be stayed while under appeal, the earliest group it 
                                                          
119.  See Hilary Russ, Athletes’ Licensing Fight Survives NCAA’s Bid to Toss, LAW360 
(Feb. 8, 2010, 7:27 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/148446/athletes-licensing-fight-
survives-ncaa-s-bid-to-toss. 
 
120.  Greg Bishop, N.C.A.A. Dodges a Bullet, But Change Is on the Way, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/11/sports/ncaabasketball/ncaa-dodges-a-
bullet-but-change-is-on-the-way.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1387310021-
/ui8tQTiZJV7z2ddt8sBLw.  
 
121.  Stewart Mandel, Judge Allows Ed O’Bannon v. NCAA to Proceed to Trial, SPORTS 
ILLUSTRATED (June 10, 2014), http://www.si.com/college-football/2014/02/20/ed-obannon-
lawsuit-proceeds-trial. 
 
122.  Steve Berkowitz, Closing Briefs Are In; O’Bannon Case in Hands of Judge, USA 
TODAY (Jul. 11, 2014, 10:21 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2014/07/10/ed-
obannon-antitrust-case-against-ncaa-closing-judge-claudia-wilken/12510271/.  
 
123.  Berkowitz, supra note 110. 
 
124.  Id. 
 
125.  Id. 
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will affect would be recruits entering school in 2016, as it will not take 
effect until the start of the next Football Bowl Subdivision and Division I 
basketball recruiting cycles.126  The ruling also mandated that while the 
NCAA will be able to cap the amount of compensation that Division I 
football and men’s basketball players can receive while they are in school, 
the cap will not be allowed to be an amount lower than the athlete’s cost of 
attending school.127  The ruling will also allow schools and conferences to 
deposit money in trust for the athletes that will become payable when the 
athletes leave an institution or their eligibility expires.128 
While the NCAA claims that it has to review the ruling, it is almost 
certain to appeal the decision, as the ruling will potentially impact the 
antitrust suit still before Judge Wilken,129 thus tying up the issue in court 
for years.  While this is a major step for college athletes because it did not 
seem right that the players’ images were used and the athletes were not able 
to be paid while their schools were making billions of dollars,130 the ruling 
also raises issues as to whether this is a sign that the college-athlete model 
is set to crumble. 
 
C. Breaking Down The Majority Opinion of the Anti-Slapp Motion: 
Right Decision, Wrong Reasons 
 
The Ninth Circuit correctly denied EA’s anti-SLAPP appeal and thus 
opened the door for arguments that the NCAA and EA wrongly interfered 
with the student-athlete’s right of publicity.131  The Ninth Circuit in In re 
                                                          
126.  Id. 
 
127.  Id. 
 
128.  Other consequences of the ruling include the following: “The NCAA will be allowed 
to set a cap on the amount of money that may be held in trust, but that cap cannot be less than 
$5,000 in 2014 dollars for every year the athletes remain academically eligible.  Schools will be 
allowed to offer less than the NCAA maximum amount if they so choose, but they cannot 
unlawfully conspire with each other in setting the amounts they offer.  The NCAA will be 
allowed have rules that prevent the athletes from using the money being held in trust for them to 
obtain other financial benefits while they are in school.  The NCAA also will be able to have rules 
that prevent schools from offering different amounts of deferred money to athletes who are in the 
same recruiting class on the same team.  The amounts that schools decide to place in trust for the 
athletes may vary from year to year.”  Id. 
129.  Berkowitz, supra note 122. 
 
130.  Id. 
 
131.  See In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1269. 
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NCAA Student-Athlete clearly recognized that the NCAA cannot 
contractually restrict or entirely eliminate a person’s right of publicity, even 
in the name of amateurism.132  While the decision is morally sound, it 
largely ignored the reality that the resulting confusion will upend the 
purpose of amateurism. 
The Court correctly rejected the First Amendment defenses that 
would have given EA a blanket license to continue to profit off of the backs 
of the athletes.133  Although the direct question of the NCAA waivers was 
not before the court, the failure to even address the waivers as they 
currently stand, regardless of ripeness, appears to be a deliberate avoidance 
of the issue.134  While the court was deciding an appeal of a denial of an 
anti-SLAPP motion, it still would have been an appropriate context to 
address the broader issues since its holding may allow student-athletes to 
bring claims in violation of the waivers.  Thus, the court’s decision is 
substantively deficient because it failed to consider the policy that its 
decision could have on the NCAA waivers.135  While the Ninth Circuit may 
have believed that it was unnecessary to address the NCAA waivers and 
amateurism, the decision exposed the shortsighted nature of the courtand 
foreshadowed future lawsuits for the courts to decide, once and for all, the 
true definition of amateurism.136 
Similarly, the pre-In re NCAA Student-Athlete holding in Hart v. 
Electronic Arts, Inc. also indicates the judiciary’s overwhelming 
willingness to recognize a limitation on First Amendment communication 
defenses in the context of the right of publicity.137  However, Hart failed to 
consider the decision’s effect on amateurism and the NCAA waivers as a 
consequence of its decision.138  The case is almost factually identical to In 
                                                          
132.  Id. 
 
133.  Id. at 1276; see also Timothy J. Bucher, Note, Game On:  Sports-Related Games and 
the Contentious Interplay Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment, 14 TEX. REV. 
ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 4 (2012); cf. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 
96 (1984) (the Court’s reasoning created greater confusion as to whether amateurism, as the 
NCAA describes it, even exists anymore). 
 
134.  See generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268. 
 
135.  See, e.g., Kendall K. Johnson, Note, Enforceable Fair and Square:  The Right of 
Publicity, Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 42-48 
(2012). 
 
136.  Id. 
 
137.  See Hart v. Elect. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013).  
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re NCAA Student-Athlete; there, the Third Circuit reversed the district 
court’s holding that First Amendment claims barred the former athlete’s 
right of publicity assertion.139  Former college athlete Ryan Hart sued EA 
for misappropriating his image while he was the star quarterback at Rutgers 
University in 2007.140  While the district court initially found that Hart did 
not state a viable right of publicity, the Third Circuit reversed and held that 
he did have a viable right of publicity that was not barred by the First 
Amendment.141  However, although the majority in Hart explicitly 
mentions that Hart was required to adhere to NCAA Bylaws while he was a 
football player at Rutgers, it does not further mention the contractual 
provisions.142  Instead, similar to the Ninth Circuit, the Court analyzed the 
case in the context of First Amendment defenses, which were identical to 
the ones raised during the subsequent Ninth Circuit decision.143 
It is clear that the First Amendment is a significant factor when 
scrutinizing sports-related videogames in the contentious context of right of 
publicity; however, merely sidestepping the issue only intensifies the 
inevitability that even more suits will be brought.144  Again, this 
demonstrates that both the Third Circuit and the Ninth Circuit were 
reluctant to consider how their decisions undermine the purpose of even 
recognizing a right of publicity for student-athletes because they did not 
consider the effect on college athletes as a whole.145 
                                                          
138.  See generally id. 
 
139.  Id. at 145; see also Cardtoons v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 
(10th Cir. 1996) (finding that while there was a right to publicity, First Amendment defenses 
generally trump that right in the absence of more compelling reasons). 
 
140.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 145. 
 
141.  Id. 
 
142.  Id. 
 
143.  Id. (citing NCAA, 2011–12 NCAA Division I Manual §§ 12.01.1; 12.1.2; 12.5.21 
(2011) (“Only an amateur student-athlete is eligible for inter-collegiate athletics participation in a 
particular sport. In relevant part, these rules state that a collegiate athlete loses his or her 
‘amateur’ status if (1) the athlete ‘[u]ses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in 
any form in that sport,’ or (2) the athlete ‘[a]ccepts any remuneration or permits the use of his or 
her name or picture to advertise, recommend or promote directly the sale or use of a commercial 
product or service of any kind.’).  
 
144.  Bucher, supra note 133, at 23.  
 
145.  See generally Maureen C. Weston, The Fantasy of Athlete Publicity Rights: Public 
Fascination and Fantasy Sports' Assertion of Free Use Place Athlete Publicity Rights on an 
Uncertain Playing Field, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 581 (2008). 
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D. The Dissent Misses The Point By Failing to Adequately Address 
the Significance of the NCAA Waivers in Light of the Majority’s Holding 
 
Unlike the majority, the dissent in In re NCAA Student-Athlete 
recognized the significance of the NCAA waivers.146  The dissent stated 
that even if student-athletes have a right of publicity, their rights are 
incredibly restricted because they are banned from receiving compensation 
and because they contractually surrendered their rights of publicity to the 
NCAA.147  In fact, the dissent emphasized that the NCAA waivers should 
have been critical to the majority’s holding because the NCAA waivers 
eradicate student-athletes’ economic rights, which, the dissent argues, is the 
key to even having a right of publicity.148  However, the dissent mistakenly 
stated that the majority erroneously equated the right of publicity of 
student-athletes with that of professional athletes.149  Not only did the 
dissent not provide any empirical data to prove that student-athletes do not 
have valuable images, but it also ignored the fact that EA Sports has made 
millions off its NCAA Football and NCAA Basketball series.150 
The dissent essentially believed that the NCAA waivers render the 
individual college athlete’s right of publicity practically nonexistent, and 
that the structure itself provides a significant backdrop to whether the right 
should be recognized.151  However, the dissent similarly avoided directly 
addressing the issue by stating “[t]he issue . . . is beyond the scope of this 
appeal,” and failed to consider that once the right of publicity is 
recognized, it undermines the NCAA rules and triggers a complete 
restructure.152  Moreover, the dissent did not consider that signing the 
                                                          
146.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d 1268, 1289 (9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
 
147.  Id. 
 
148.  Id.; see also Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 94 Cal. App. 4th 400, 415 (2001) 
(“The right to exploit commercially one’s celebrity is primarily an economic right.”). 
 
149.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1286 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 
150.  See Chris Smith, NCAA Football Video Game Is Worth Over $75,000 Per Year for 
Top Teams, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2013, 10:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/chrissmith/2013/ 
08/22/ncaa-football-video-game-is-worth-over-75000-per-year-for-top-teams/. 
 
151.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1289 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 
152.  Id. at n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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NCAA waivers alone does not mean the agreements are enforceable.153 
 
IV. THE APPLICATION OF UNCONSCIONABILITY DOCTRINE 
TO THE NCAA WAIVERS 
 
This section will argue that student-athletes can attack the NCAA 
waivers under the contractual doctrine of unconscionability in light of the 
In re NCAA Student-Athlete holding. 
 
A. The Unconscionability Doctrine 
 
One burning question is whether the Ninth Circuit’s holding has 
rendered NCAA Bylaws 12.5.1 and 12.5.2 unenforceable.154  Many critics 
have contended that the NCAA waivers are unconscionable because the 
terms of the contracts unreasonably favor the NCAA.155  Well-known 
athletes who enter college with a clear right of publicity usually receive the 
strongest support for NCAA waivers being unconscionable.156  In re NCAA 
Student-Athlete opens the door for the argument that the NCAA waivers are 
unconscionable. 
Unconscionability is a doctrine of contract law that describes terms 
that are so extremely unjust, or overwhelmingly one-sided in favor of the 
party who has the superior bargaining power that the party does not 
contract in good conscience.157  Unconscionability is generally defined as 
an “absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together 
with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other 
                                                          
153.  See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can 
Learn From Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006). 
 
154.  See Christian Dennie, Amateurism Stifles A Student-Athlete's Dream, 12 SPORTS 
LAW. J. 221, 234-37 (2005) (citing Interview with Aaron Adair, Former Student-Athlete, 
University of Oklahoma, in Norman, Okla. (Oct. 26, 2003)). 
 
155.  See Kristine Mueller, Note, No Control Over Their Rights of Publicity: College 
Athletes Left Sitting the Bench, 2 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 70, 70-71 (2004); 
Kendall K. Johnson, Note, Enforceable Fair and Square: The Right of Publicity, 
Unconscionability, and NCAA Student-Athlete Contracts, 19 SPORTS LAW. J. 1, 48 (2012).  
 
156.  Mueller, supra note 155 at 70-71.  
 
157.  See, e.g., John Edward Murray, Jr., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 30, at 61-64 (4th ed. 
2001); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 4.287, at 307-08 (3d ed. 1999); see generally 
Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 
LA. L. REV. 123 (2005). 
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parties.”158  Typically, an unconscionable contract is deemed unenforceable 
because no reasonable or informed person would otherwise agree to it.159 
Courts determine unconscionability by examining the circumstances 
of the parties when the contract was made, such as their bargaining power, 
age, and mental capacity.160  Other issues potentially include lack of 
choice, superior knowledge, and other obligations or circumstances 
surrounding the bargaining process.161  Additionally, “unconscionably” 
taking advantage of another party can render a contract unenforceable in a 
civil action.162  In order to successfully establish unconscionability, the 
issue is whether the contract was unconscionable at the time it was made; 
therefore, subsequent circumstances that make the contract extremely one-
sided are considered irrelevant.163  Unconscionability is a factual analysis 
decided by a judge, and only applied when it would be a serious affront to 
the integrity of the judicial system to enforce such a contract.164  In some 
instances, a judge only may render the offending clause unenforceable 
while upholding other aspects of the contract in order to bring about a fair 
outcome.165 
In addition to unconscionability, to invalidate a contract or contractual 
clause on the basis of unconscionability, most courts require a showing of 
both procedural and substantive unconscionability.166  Procedural 
                                                          
158.  Farnsworth, supra note 157 at 311 (citing Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture 
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)). 
 
159.  Id. 
 
160.  Id. 
 
161.  Id. 
 
162.  See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 
163.  See id. at 450.  Compare Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 629-31 (1943) (discussing that freedom of 
contract relates to society’s free enterprise system), with E. Allan Farnsworth, CONTRACTS § 1.7, 
at 20-21 (3d ed. 1999) (stating that the decline of the free enterprise system in the 20th century 
has led to a shift away from the historical emphasis on freedom of contract). 
 
164.  See Farnsworth supra note 157; see Williams, 350 F.2d at 449. 
 
165.  See Carboni v. Arrospide, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 845, 847 (Ct. App. 1991). 
 
166.  See, e.g., Svalina v. Split Rock Land & Cattle Co., 816 P.2d 878, 882 (Wyo. 1991) 
(listing six factors used to determine procedural unconscionability, including whenever “one 
party [was] in some manner surprised by fine print or concealed terms”); see Farnsworth supra 
note 158.; see also Williams, 350 F.2d at 449 (noting that terms can be procedurally 
unconscionable if they are “hidden in a maze of fine print”).   
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unconscionability focuses on identifying flaws in the contract that made the 
agreement either unfairly surprising or coercive;167 substantive 
unconscionability focuses on defects in the bargaining process by 
identifying grossly one-sided terms.168  Generally, if there is more of one 
type of unconscionability present, less evidence of the other is required.169 
Thus, unconscionability is reserved for the most extreme cases, and 
unfortunately, most contractual challenges based on unconscionability 
fail.170  A mere imbalance of consideration between the parties is not 
enough to establish that a contract is unconscionable.171  Clearly, in order 
for the student-athletes to establish unconscionability, it is not enough to 
demonstrate disparity in size and bargaining power, or that the deal is 
unfair; student-athletes must show that the contract is so grossly one-sided 
and procedurally flawed that it “shock[s] the conscience.”172  Ultimately, 
however, student-athletes will be able to establish unconscionability as to 
the NCAA waivers.173 
                                                          
167.  See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Superior Court, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789, 795 (Ct. App. 
1989). 
 
168.  Id. 
 
169.  Id. (“A relatively larger degree of one will compensate for a relatively smaller 
degree of the other.”); see, e.g., Carboni, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 849 (noting the sliding scale 
relationship between the two concepts). 
 
170.  See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic Judging and 
the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1420, 1442 (2008) (“[I]t is well 
known that unconscionability is generally a loser of an argument.”); see also Danielle Kie 
Hart, Contract Formation and the Entrenchment of Power, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 175, 215 n.219 
(2009) (“[E]mpirical studies indicate that challenges based on contract policing doctrines, like 
duress and unconscionability, usually fail.”).   
 
171.  Even in cases where the result was extremely harsh, contracts have been enforced.  
See, e.g., Drake v. W. Va. Self-Storage, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 21, 26 (W. Va. 1998) (holding that a 
contract entitled the defendant to sell plaintiff's possessions worth more than $10,000 for $150 
when she failed to make $40 rental payments on a storage unit); Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 
P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976) (“The UCC does not require that there be complete equality of 
bargaining power or that the agreement be equally beneficial to both parties”) (citations omitted); 
M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 766 (1969) (“[M]ere 
disparity of bargaining strength, without more, is not enough to make out a case of 
unconscionability.”). 
 
172.  See Johnson, supra note 155, at 18 (quoting Osgood v. Franklin, 1 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 
275 (1816) (stating that unconscionability requires that an agreement ”shock the conscience and 
confound the judgment of any man of common sense.”)) (citing Cal. Grocers Ass'n v. Bank of 
Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 402 (Ct. App. 1994)).  
 
173.  See generally id.  
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B. Student-Athletes Are Unfairly Surprised  
by the Terms of the Student-Athlete Waivers 
 
Unfair surprise is a key part of establishing procedural 
unconscionability.174  This occurs when one party is either unable to 
comprehend the terms of the agreement, or is unaware that the terms 
existed in the first place.175  Some examples of unfair surprise include when 
a party is uneducated, illiterate, unable to comprehend the language of the 
agreement, or is limited in understanding by infancy or mental 
incapacity.176  Unfair surprise also occurs when a term is buried in small 
print, found in an unexpected location, or couched in intentionally 
confusing language.177  However, this is not an exhaustive list.178  
Moreover, all parties are charged with a duty to read the terms of a 
contract—parties who simply failed to read the agreement cannot claim 
unfair surprise.179 
The NCAA process takes advantage of young and inexperienced 
student-athletes who truly do not comprehend the magnitude of the contract 
                                                          
174.  See Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1296 (9th Cir. 2006). 
175.  See Sanchez v. W. Pizza Enter., 172 Cal. App. 4th 154, 173 (2009) (“Unfair surprise 
results from misleading bargaining conduct or other circumstances indicating that a party’s 
consent was not an informed choice.”). 
 
176.  Jackson v. Bank of Am. Corp., 711 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Amoco Oil 
Co. v. Ashcraft, 791 F.2d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that “mental incapacity that prevents 
a party from ‘appreciating the significance of the agreement’” is enough for unfair surprise under 
unconscionability)); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 264, 269 (E.D. Mich. 1976) 
(holding that illiteracy was sufficient to find unfair surprise); Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 
P.2d 455, 462 (Utah 1983) (citing Wille v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 549 P.2d 903, 907 (Kan. 1976)) 
(explaining that unfair surprise can be shown when parties are “underprivileged, unsophisticated, 
uneducated and illiterate.”)); Lovey v. Regence Blueshield of Idaho, 72 P.3d 877, 882 (Idaho 
2003) (indicating that unfair surprise can be demonstrated through “lack of understanding 
regarding the contract terms arising from the use of inconspicuous print, ambiguous wording, or 
complex legalistic language; the lack of opportunity to study the contract and inquire about its 
terms; or disparity in sophistication, knowledge, or experience of the parties.”). 
 
177.  Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 948 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Idaho 1997); see Lovey, 72 
P.3d at 882.  
 
178.  See generally Lovey, 72 P.3d 877 (unfair surprise can include convoluted language 
and fine print). 
 
179.  Stanley A. Kopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807, 811 (E.D. Pa. 1981) 
(“[A] person has a duty to read a contract before signing it and his failure to do so will not excuse 
his ignorance of its contents.”). 
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that they are signing.180  Student-athletes, some of whom are not even 
eighteen-years-old at the time of contracting, are signing a contract that has 
been drafted by a party that is substantially more sophisticated and far more 
knowledgeable about the contract and its implications than the student-
athletes.181 
Few student-athletes, if any, consult an attorney first and are 
precluded from hiring an agent since that would violate the NCAA 
Bylaws.182  Yet, it is puzzling that supporters of the NCAA process contend 
that these factors are not enough to find the NCAA process procedurally 
unconscionable, considering that many courts applying this rule to 
arbitration agreements have found procedurally unconscionable those that 
involve parties of unequal size, sophistication, and bargaining power.183  
While it is true that courts have found that disparity in size alone is not 
enough to render a contract unconscionable, disparity taken with other 
factors tends to support unconscionability.184  Furthermore, while the 
NCAA undoubtedly has the power to take steps to ensure the student-
athletes understand the terms and that the clauses are conspicuous, there is 
no evidence that the NCAA actually takes steps such as explaining some of 
the terms, putting key terms in bold type, and using contrasting colors or 
capital letters.185 
                                                          
180.  Preston Peeden, NCAA Corrupt, Takes Advantage of Players, THE DAILY BEACON 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://utdailybeacon.com/sports/2013/apr/25/ncaa-corrupt-takes-advantage-
players/. 
 
181.  See Michael McCann, NCAA Faces Unspecified Damages, Changes in Latest Anti-
Trust Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 21, 2009), http://www.si.com/more-
sports/2009/07/21/ncaa (noting that “the lack of ‘life experience’ of most incoming student-
athletes” makes the process “exploitive and also one that creates a disparity in bargaining 
power”). 
 
182.  See, e.g., The Truth Behind the National Letter of Intent, NEON TOMMY (Apr. 29, 
2010, 12:19 AM), http://www.neontommy.com/2010/04/national-letter-of-intent. 
 
183.  See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citing 
several California Supreme Court cases in which California courts have applied this rule of 
unconscionability to invalidate arbitration agreements or portions thereof on grounds of 
unconscionability).  Any meaningful distinctions that may exist between arbitration agreements 
and contracts are not important in this context, for the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasizes that 
arbitration agreements stand on “equal footing” with contracts.  Id. (citing Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)). 
 
184.  See id. at 1746. 
 
185.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 20-21 (supporting the notion that the use of the given 
methods makes a contract more enforceable as a consequence of the clauses being more 
conspicuous) (citations omitted); see Hubbert v. Dell Corp., 835 N.E.2d 113, 124 (Ill. App. Ct. 
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Supporters of the NCAA waivers also fail to demonstrate that student-
athletes actually comprehend the terms.186  In fact, one supporter merely 
concludes that “in all but the rarest cases, a student-athlete is fully aware of 
the relevant terms of the agreement.”187  While some comprehension 
arguably can be presumed based on the general education presumptions 
since prospective student-athletes must be high school seniors, this 
presumption is not enough to make a blanket-sweeping statement that 
“student-athlete[s] [are] fully aware of the relevant terms.”188 
Although the NCAA Student-Athlete Statement is a mere seven pages 
long with seven short separate clauses,189 such brevity is not dispositive in 
and of itself to establish that all or even most student-athletes understand its 
terms.  This is especially true since the actual NCAA Student-Athlete 
Manual that the contract internally references is almost 500 pages.190  
Furthermore, while the fact that each clause “requires an individual 
signature” could imply that the student-athlete has acknowledged the clause 
in question,191 the mere act of signing each clause does not on its own mean 
that the athlete has been made fully aware of the magnitude of the terms.  
Finally, the fact that the contract was “written in comparatively plain 
English” is arguably still fairly subjective considering that many student-
athletes come from ethnically diverse or limited educational backgrounds 
or lower socioeconomic statuses; practically speaking, their versions of 
“plain English” will differ greatly from those understood by legal 
scholars.192 
While NCAA-member schools do employ a compliance staff who are 
                                                          
2005) (identifying methods a contracting party can employ that a court may look to for purposes 
of rendering a clause conspicuous). 
 
186.  Id. at 21, n.143 (2012) (referencing Stanford Univ. Dept. of Athletics, 2010-11 
Student-Athlete Handbook 5, 32 (2010)) (noting that Stanford University’s compliance personnel 
attempts to help student-athletes understand these terms).  Note that attempting to help a student-
athlete understand a contract’s terms does not guarantee that the student-athlete will ultimately 
understand its terms. 
 
187.  Id. at 21. 
 
188.  Id. 
 
189.  Id. 
 
190.  Id. at 20.  
 
191.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 21. 
 
192.  Id. 
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supposed to be available to explain the NCAA regulations and meet with 
student-athletes on an annual basis,193 mere availability is not enough to 
show that the staff actually met with or explained the terms to the student-
athletes.  Even so, the compliance staff is primarily there to protect the 
NCAA and member schools’ interests.194  Moreover, the compliance staff 
is only available after the student-athlete becomes an enrolled student and 
is not a part of the initial contracting, which arguably is the heart of the 
unconscionability claim.  Thus, the compliance staff has no incentive to 
explain the NCAA rules to prospective student-athletes.  Although the 
Student-Athlete statement “explicitly refers student-athletes to a school’s 
compliance staff and athletic director to explain the terms . . . [and 
provides] a phone number for the NCAA where additional questions can be 
answered,” 195 the statement fails to demonstrate whether, if at all, student-
athletes fully realize that the school has sole right to profit from and use the 
student-athletes’ images. 
Although the NCAA process arguably mandates parental involvement 
because parental signatures are required on three of the main contractual 
documents for all student-athletes, this is only required for student-athletes 
who are minors.196  While parents arguably have the best intentions for 
their children, it is unclear whether they truly understand the magnitude of 
what they are signing on behalf of their children. 
Finally, supporters of the NCAA waivers fail to demonstrate that 
student-athletes are capable of fully assenting to a contract simply because 
they have been admitted to college.197  Mere admission to college is not 
enough to state that the student-athletes can comprehend legal agreements, 
especially since many were admitted only on the basis of their athletic 
ability and had poor academic performance.198  It is also untrue that 
                                                          
193.  See, e.g., id. 
194.  William C. Rhoden, University Compliance Officers: Good Cop, Bad Cop, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 10, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/11/sports/ncaabasketball/11rhoden.htm 
l?_r=0. 
 
195.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 21.  
 
196.  See, e.g., Drug-Testing Consent Form – NCAA Division III, NCAA, http://www.nca 
a.org/sites/default/files/DIII%20Form%2014-3f%20-%20Drug%20Testing%20 Consent_0.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2014). 
 
197.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 22.  
 
198.  See Allie Grasgreen, A Rules Rebuke, INSIDE HIGHER ED (May 3, 2013), 
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2013/05/03/ncaa-backtracks-recruiting-academic-rules; see 
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student-athletes must show a mastery of reading comprehension on the 
SAT.199  While student-athletes must receive a satisfactory score,200 this 
basically means that student-athletes cannot completely fail the exam.  
Thus, based on this low standard, it is difficult to determine whether 
student-athletes are in the top of their class academically.201  While it is 
true that age alone is not enough to render a contract unconscionable,202 
especially for student-athletes who are underage when they sign, it is a 
factor that, combined with others, can lean towards unconscionability.203 
Even so, supporters of the waivers failed to demonstrate that the 
NCAA process as a whole is sufficient to make the contract procedurally 
conscionable.204  Supporters attempt to point to the fact that “[y]oung 
people in the United States make decisions with far greater implications 
than the decision to allow an NCAA institution to use their publicity 
rights,” by stating 18-year-olds are eligible to serve life imprisonment.205  
This analogy is severely misplaced because likening life imprisonment to 
the NCAA contracts is simply not comparable because, arguably, life 
imprisonment is not a meaningful contract with the corrections department. 
Ultimately, there are factors present that would help the student-
athletes challenge the waivers as unconscionable, especially in light of In 
re NCAA Student Athlete.206  In fact, in In re NCAA Student-Athlete, the 
court held that, contrary to the NCAA waivers, student-athletes do have a 
                                                          
also Sara Ganim, CNN Analysis: Some College Athletes Play Like Adults, Read Like 5th-Graders, 
CNN (Jan. 8, 2014, 1:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/01/07/us/ncaa-athletes-reading-scores/. 
 
199.   See Grasgreen, supra note 198; see also Ganim, supra note 198. 
 
200.  See Ganim, supra note 198; see also Sam Weyrauch, Banded Together: Recruited 
Athletes with Sub-Average Academics Can Receive Preference in Admissions, THE BOWDOIN 
ORIENT (Mar. 28, 2014), http://bowdoinorient.com/article/9151; see generally Paula Lavigne, 
Bad Grades? Some Schools Ok With It, ESPN (Oct. 18, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://espn.go.com/espn 
/otl/story/_/page/Outside-The-Lines-GPA/some-high-schools-actually-reducing-gpa-
requirements-student-athletes. 
 
201.  See Grasgreen, supra note 198; see also Ganim, supra note 198. 
 
202.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 22.  
 
203.  See Thi of Georgia at Shamrock, LLC v. Fields, No. CV 313-032, 2013 WL 
6097569, at *4 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 18, 2013). 
 
204.  Contra Johnson, supra note 155, at 23. 
 
205.  Contra id. 
 
206.  See generally In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 
F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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right of publicity that is not contractually eliminated.207  Thus, the NCAA 
student-athlete waivers are likely procedurally unconscionable because the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding opens the door for student-athletes to attack this 
offensive clause. 
 
C. Student-Athletes Do Not Have a Meaningful Choice 
 to Not Contract with the NCAA Because  
Their Playing Choices Are Extremely Limited 
 
Supporters of the NCAA process claim that the most compelling 
theory that cuts against procedural unconscionability is that student-athletes 
have the option of either foregoing the NCAA contract altogether or to 
contract with a party outside of the NCAA.208  However, just because these 
options are available does not mean that the student-athletes still have a 
meaningful choice.209 
The NCAA is an organization that clearly provides student-athletes 
with an unmatched opportunity to compete at an elite level while pursuing 
a college degree.210  The NCAA offers its contracts on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis and do not allow any negotiation with the student-athletes.211  Thus, 
the NCAA waivers are adhesion contracts, meaning that the student-athlete 
has no meaningful choice but to sign if they want to compete at an elite 
level in college sports.212  While it is true that adhesion alone is not per se 
unconscionable, it is one of many factors leaning in favor of finding 
unconscionability.213  Although adhesion contracts are prevalent, and most 
are enforceable, the real issue here is whether the student-athletes can 
reasonably reject it without giving up an opportunity to be noticed on a 
heightened level that is more likely to lead to professional playing 
                                                          
207.  Id. at 1269. 
 
208.  See Johnson, supra note 155, at 25-26. 
 
209.  See, e.g., Williams, 350 F.2d at 449–50. 
 
210.  Jason Belzer, Leveling the Playing Field: Student Athletes or Employee-Athletes?, 
FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jasonbelzer/2013/09/09/leveling-
the-playing-field-student-athletes-or-employee-athletes/. 
 
211.  See The Value of College Sports, NCAA (Sept. 26, 2014; 4:42 PM), http://www.ncaa 
.org/student-athletes/value-college-sports. 
 
212.  See Morris v. Redwood Empire Bancorp, 27 Cal. Rptr. 3d 797, 807 (Ct. App. 2005). 
 
213.  Id. 
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opportunities.214 
Courts have found lack of meaningful choice when there is only one 
provider of a certain product or service and in those situations, the weaker 
party must accept the terms of the service or forego the product or service 
altogether because the provider is unwilling to negotiate the terms.215  This 
clearly epitomizes the NCAA; no organization rivals the NCAA when it 
comes to size and prestige of the organization, as well as the opportunity to 
have collegiate scholarships and the opportunity to simultaneously engage 
in athletics and academics at a superior level.216 Even though Major League 
Baseball (“MLB”) does allow high school students to be drafted directly 
out of high school,217 this is still incomparable because only the top high 
school prospects have realistic chances of being drafted.  It is also 
undisputed that the NCAA is not only a key step on the path to becoming a 
professional athlete, it also provides the student-athletes with the most 
prominent national stage for professional scouts and recruiters.218 
Supporters of the NCAA process claim that “just because the NCAA 
may be the best provider of athletic opportunities does not mean that the 
NCAA is the only provider of such opportunities,” and this heavily weighs 
against finding unconscionability.219  While courts have found that 
dominance of a certain provider does not make that seller a monopolist, the 
unconscionability analysis does not stop there,220 and while the “coercive 
power of a monopolistic seller” is arguably alleviated when providers offer 
the weaker party the option to go elsewhere,221 the alternative choice here 
(outside the NCAA) is simply incomparable in the field of amateur 
athletics. 
Although there are many cases where no unconscionability was found 
because plaintiffs had an alternative choice in choosing a good or service, 
                                                          
214.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 25.  
 
215.  See, e.g., Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1981). 
 
216.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 25.   
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the majority of those cases are incomparable. For instance, the sale of 
advertisements exclusively should be distinguishable from having to give 
up one’s image rights in order to participate in high level sports.  The court 
in Discount Fabric House of Racine v. Wisconsin Telephone Company held 
that a contract specifically limiting liability for errors in advertising was 
unconscionable.  There, the telephone directory containing the 
advertisements was an “indispensable element of telephone service” due to 
the company’s commercial efforts and there were no equal competitive 
methods for advertisement.222  It is worth noting that there is a 
jurisdictional split concerning whether the meaningful alternative choice 
should at least be comparable, rather than just an alternative.223 
In the amateur athletics context, there are no realistic meaningful 
alternatives.  While it is true that student-athletes may participate in the 
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA) or the National 
Junior College Athletic Association (NJCAA), these are not only 
significantly limited options, but clearly few professional sports teams, if 
any, scout for student-athletes from that arena.224  Moreover, while the best 
young basketball players can play professionally in the National Basketball 
Association (NBA), National Summer League (NSL), or National 
Development League (NDL), once they turn nineteen or have completed 
one year of college, that field is primarily comprised of bench players, and 
not as easy to break into as the NCAA.225  Of course, while student-athletes 
                                                          
222.  See Disc. Fabric House of Racine v. Wis. Tel. Co., 345 N.W.2d 417, 425-26 (Wis. 
1984). 
 
223.  Compare Allen v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 171 N.W.2d 689, 692 (Mich. 1969), with 
Louisville Bear Safety Serv. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 571 S.W.2d 438, 439-40 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1978). 
 
224.  Colleges, NJCAA (Aug. 19, 2014, 2:08 PM), http://www.njcaa.org/colleges.cfm; 
Guide NAIA: Guide For College-Bound Student-Athlete, NAIA, 2, http://www.naia.org/fls/2790 
0/1NAIA/membership/NAIA_GuidefortheCollegeBoundStudent.pdf?DB_OEM_ID=27900 (last 
visited Oct. 24, 2014) (the NAIA has nearly 300 member institutions with around $450 million 
dollars in financial aid each year); NAIA College Athletes and Athletic Scholarships, NAIA (Aug. 
18, 2014, 2:50PM), http://www.athleticscholarships.net/naiainformation.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 
2014); see Information for a Prospective NJCAA Student-Athlete, NJCAA, 1, http://www.njcaa.o 
rg/njcaaforms/140605_2_Prospective%20student%20brochure%2014-15.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 
2014) (the NJCAA has 513 member institutions and also provides athletic aid to student-athletes).   
However, these facts alone do not demonstrate how many players make the leap from the NAIA 
to either the NBA, NFL or WNBA, in contrast to the NCAA.  
 
225.  See Player Eligibility and NBA Draft, NBA PLAYERS ASSOCIATION, 1-2, 
http://www.nbpa.com/sites/nbpa.org/files/ARTICLE%20X.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2014).  Note 
that a 2005 change to NBA Draft rules limited the number of high school seniors who are eligible 
to be selected, but some, such as John Wall, may be eligible to make the leap from high school to 
the NBA. 
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can play semi-professionally for the American Basketball Association, the 
World Basketball League, or the International Basketball League, those are 
still developmental leagues that are restricted to the very top players that 
are not the typical student-athlete coming into their own during college.226 
There is also no real meaningful choice to participate in amateur 
football outside of the NCAA.  While budding football players may 
participate in arena football, this is not an amateur sport because these 
players receive compensation.227  In fact, in the case of Terrell Owens, it 
was more of a career-ending move to play arena football in an attempt to 
get back into the National Football League (NFL).228  While supporters 
claim there are potential opportunities to play American-style football 
abroad, it ignores the lack of realistic opportunities that would develop 
from those options.229  Moreover, there are no true statistics of how many 
student-athletes who play in these alternative leagues garner recognition in 
the NBA or NFL drafts that translates into professional play.230 
While supporters concede that “these options are not perfectly 
comparable to the experience that the NCAA provides and do not afford 
identical benefits,” they also fail to demonstrate how the mere possibility of 
participating, however attenuated, in a less stellar field may equate to 
coming out with the same skills.231  Hence, while student-athletes arguably 
have a mere “choice to take their athletic skills elsewhere,” the reality is 
that if they wish to play at a high level and transition into professional 
sports, the only real option appears to be the NCAA.232 
 
 
                                                          
226.  See Johnson, supra note 155, at 27.  
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D. The NCAA Contracts Are Substantively  
Unconscionable and Unfair 
 
The fact that the contract terms unreasonably favor the NCAA 
strongly suggests that they are substantively unconscionable.233  Not only 
do the contract terms unreasonably favor the NCAA, but the potential 
scholarship benefits, if available, pale in comparison to the NCAA’s 
substantial merchandise licensing revenue and the multibillion-dollar 
television contracts.234  In fact, one supporter of the NCAA process even 
states “it is estimated that Patrick Ewing generated $12 million in revenue 
for Georgetown University during his four years at school in the early 
1980s, far more than the value of his athletic scholarship.”235  Clearly 
NCAA revenue primarily comes from licensing student-athlete images for 
use in television broadcasts and merchandising.236  Thus, student-athlete 
images undoubtedly generate a substantial portion of the revenue for the 
NCAA and its member schools.237 
Student-athletes are also barred from receiving monetary 
compensation for their services while they are in school and, once they 
graduate, do not receive any royalties from NCAA products that continue 
to be sold using their likenesses.238  Former student-athlete and In re NCAA 
Student-Athlete plaintiff Oscar Robertson claimed that the NCAA has 
continued to profit off his image by selling “Greats of the Game” trading 
cards, cut-up pieces of his uniform, photographs from his playing days, and 
                                                          
233.  See Cordova v. World Fin. Corp. of N.M., 208 P.3d 901, 907 (N.M. 2009). 
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238.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 32; see also In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 
1289 (Thomas J., dissenting).  
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video footage from his college games and has never compensated him.239  
Fellow plaintiff Tate George claimed that a clip of his game-winning shot 
during the 1990 NCAA Tournament, which ESPN has ranked one of the 
top five NCAA shots of all time, has been included in commercials for 
Vitamin Water, McDonald’s, Burger King, Buick, Chrysler, and 
Cadillac.240  George has also never received any compensation.241  Finally, 
plaintiff Samuel Keller has focused on the use of his image in video games 
such as the “NCAA Football” series produced by EA, in which the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately held for Keller.242  Other plaintiffs have pointed to the 
NCAA’s profits from DVD sales, premium content on Web sites, jerseys 
and other apparel, posters, and rebroadcasts of classic games where their 
images were used.243  The value that the NCAA reaps by taking the 
publicity rights of student-athletes is grossly disproportionate to the 
scholarship benefits the student-athletes receive in exchange.244  Thus, 
these fantastical figures lean in favor of finding that the NCAA contracts 
meet the legal definition of substantive unconscionability.245 
It is true that the unconscionability analysis must be taken as a whole 
and must be so grossly unfair to one party that the agreement as a whole 
“shock[s] the conscience.”246  Supporters of the NCAA provisions argue 
that student-athletes “receive the better end of the deal” in the form of 
scholarships, training and other benefits.247  Arguably, while student-
athletes do receive extremely valuable benefits in the form of scholarships, 
these benefits pale in comparison to the licensing revenues generated.  
Moreover, although NCAA schools provide benefits like travel, hotel stays 
and meals, to its student-athletes, these opportunities are also available to 
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241.  Id. at *29-34.  
 
242.  In re NCAA Student-Athlete, 724 F.3d at 1283-84. 
 
243.  Robertson, No. CV 11 0388, 2011 WL 240797, at *16, 17, 27, 28, 36-38. 
 
244.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 6. 
 
245.  See Cordova, 208 P.3d at 901, 907-08. 
 
246.  Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 480 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 
247.  Johnson, supra note 155, at 33. 
 
THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2015  1:58 PM 
2014] THE ONE-SIDED GAMES OF THE NCAA 133 
other non-athletic teams such as debate clubs.248  Moreover, while student-
athletes arguably receive access to the best athletic facilities, some of those 
facilities are also open to non-NCAA students for use on non-game or 
practice days.249 
The most important benefit from playing in the NCAA that student-
athletes receive is publicity from playing at such a high level.  Supporters 
may argue that the publicity benefit received is attributed to the NCAA-
funded public relations program to “promote [student-athletes’] 
accomplishments,” as well as the fact that many formerly unknown players 
“rise to stardom as a result of the NCAA-managed publicity.”250  However, 
this still ignores the fact that the NCAA is the only such stage where a 
student-athlete can receive that high caliber of publicity, since, as 
previously discussed, there is almost no comparable opportunity in other 
such arenas.251 
While supporters of the NCAA process may try to qualify the NCAA 
right to use the images as “limited” and “nonexclusive,” it downplays the 
very fact that it is truly exclusive because the players themselves cannot 
benefit from the use of their own images.252  While the NCAA only has the 
right to use the player’s image as an NCAA athlete, and not his image as a 
whole, the student-athletes are solely challenging the use of their images 
from athletic participation, and not from other contexts.253  Hence, while 
supporters of the NCAA process claim that student-athlete images are 
effectively worth nothing on the market, the very fact that these images and 
names help sell NCAA merchandise demonstrate the value of the 
images.254 
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It is true that while courts “are not in the business of evaluating the 
fairness of contracts and attempting to achieve absolute equity,” they still 
must ensure that there is some fairness in the process.255  Although the 
freedom of contract does allow parties to agree to terms that are blatantly 
imbalanced, the purpose of that prong rides on the freedom aspect, which is 
undoubtedly vitiated when there is no real meaningful choice to go outside 
the NCAA.256 Courts look for terms that provide one party with no real 
opportunity to benefit or terms that “no man in his senses and not under 
delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest and fair man would 
accept on the other.”257  Thus, especially in extreme cases, addressed in 
more detail below, the NCAA comes out on the better end of the deal, and 
often comes out so far ahead that the deal can be purported to “shock the 
conscience.” 
 
E. Well-Known Student-Athletes with Extremely Valuable Images 
Epitomize the Unconscionability of NCAA Waivers 
 
It is undisputed that some student-athletes do come out of high school 
with an image that is practically guaranteed to be profitable.258  For 
instance, former Texas A&M quarterback Johnny Manziel was highly 
recruited out of high school and received publicity for his football prowess 
since his sophomore year of high school.259  “Others have received enough 
attention prior to college to have concrete marketing opportunities.”260  
When these student-athletes sign a contract giving away rights worth 
millions of dollars in exchange for a scholarship, the benefits of the 
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contract are disparate enough to “shock the conscience,” and as such, 
unenforceable.261 
“While a mediocre basketball player’s non-NCAA alternatives may 
be limited to recreational or semi-pro leagues, a high-profile player likely 
has his choice of any professional league in the world.”262  Pursuant to 
NBA rules, a player must be one year removed from high school to be 
eligible to play in the NBA, regardless of whether he plays NCAA sports or 
not.263  Moreover, as previously mentioned, the mere potential of an option 
alone does not necessarily render it a meaningful choice if it is not 
comparable.264  Thus, the mere possibility of options is insufficient to pass 
substantial conscionability because the student-athlete does not have a 
meaningful choice to reject the terms.265 
“Second, the substantive value of a student-athlete’s image” makes it 
easier to establish substantive unconscionability.266  While a well-known 
student-athlete with a valuable image can receive immense consideration in 
return for the use of his image at a higher level than the average athlete 
because of the professional opportunities the NCAA experience makes 
available, this consideration does not justify depriving the student-athlete 
of his right of publicity.267 
Although for most student-athletes, the access to world-class coaches 
and promotion from awards and honors have experiential value, these 
benefits do not negate the fact that the NCAA is receiving millions of 
dollars that may outweigh the experiential value.268  “For the average 
softball player, swimmer, or fencer – no matter how talented – the 
experience ends upon graduation and has no cash value.”269  Yet “ for a 
high-profile athlete, particularly a men’s basketball player or football 
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player, the training and exposure he receives in college”270 suggests a 
strongly likelihood of success that both the NCAA and schools are aware 
of at the time of recruitment.271  “Success in the NCAA can earn a player 
hundreds of millions of dollars in eventual professional salary and 
promotional opportunities,” in addition to the possible thousands, if not 
millions, generated by using his image.272  Therefore, although the potential 
reward for the student-athlete may arguably increase as the value in his or 
her image increases, the emphasis here turns on potential, which is still 
speculative and fails to counterbalance the actual proven monetary reward 
that the NCAA and its member schools receive.273 
 
F. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Epitomizes  
the Importance of Student-Athletes’ Right of Publicity 
 
Substantive unconscionability “turns not only on a ‘one-sided’ result, 
but also on an absence of ‘justification’ for it.”274  While the NCAA claims 
to be a nonprofit organization and attempts to justify its actions through 
“amateurism,” the fact remains that the NCAA is essentially profiting on 
the millions of dollars that the student-athletes generate for them.275 Thus, 
while it is true that the skyrocketing costs at universities in a struggling 
economy have recently threatened opportunities for athletes in “nonrevenue 
sports,” the NCAA should not be given a blanket license to profit from 
student-athletes on an exclusive basis, especially considering that athlete 
images help generate billions in licensing fees.276  While the NCAA may 
claim that it “needs to implement a holistic funding model that takes 
revenue from more profitable sports,” this self-serving statement, combined 
with the other unconscionable factors leads in strong favor of finding 
unconscionability.277 
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Moreover, there is no evidence that “an alternative right of publicity 
term that provided compensation to student-athletes even after 
graduation”278 would undermine the amateurism goal in NCAA sports 
because there is no evidence that merely receiving money for use of one’s 
image makes that athlete non-professional.279  While some courts, notably 
the Fifth Circuit in McCormick v. NCAA and the United States Supreme 
Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents, have stated the amateur character of 
college athletics creates a unique product that would not exist if players 
were  paid, this was mere dicta and did not address the heart of the holding 
in those cases.280  Furthermore, those cases concerned antitrust issues, and 
did not consider the doctrine of unconscionability.281  It is true that the 
NCAA provides a unique experience that allows student-athletes a wide 
range of sports while receiving an education; however, even if the NCAA 
believes it has a legitimate business reason for excluding athletes from 
benefitting financially, that subjective reason is not enough to show that 
paying the student-athletes undermines amateurism.282 
 
G. Policy Reasons in Favor of Finding the Contract’s 
Unconscionability 
 
These contracts clearly fit into the broader scheme of the 
unconscionability analysis, especially since the very heart of the contract is 
designed to “cure abuses in the natural bargaining process.”283  While it is 
not there to level the playing field, the very nature of the unconscionability 
analysis is a vehicle that addresses bargaining power that is grossly 
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unequal.284  While arguably some imbalance is not enough, the issue turns 
on gross imbalance that threatens to overturn the heart of contract law.285 
It is true that the unconscionability doctrine only aims to preserve the 
integrity of the bargaining process by identifying and correcting contracts 
that resulted from an abuse of bargaining power.286  However, abuse occurs 
when a party with superior knowledge of the process has used that power to 
trick or coerce the other party into making a deal that was not truly 
voluntary.287  It is clear the NCAA agreements fit these terms.288  In re 
NCAA Student-Athlete mandates student athletes have the power in their 
images; therefore, court intervention is necessary to render the contracts 
unconscionable to cure a defect in the bargaining process.289  While 
declaring the contracts unconscionable increases the bargaining power of 
the student and potentially alters the balance of power between the parties, 
such a result is needed to eliminate NCAA’s current monopoly of 
control.290 
It is also untrue that court intervention would interfere with the 
general right to contract.291  While courts can find unconscionability based 
on youth and inexperience, it would not restrict student-athletes’ right to 
contract at all, especially because youths can contract generally.292  The 
issue depends on one party taking advantage of the other, and such 
intervention is unlikely to lead to widespread consequences of undermining 
the economic efficiency of contracts.293  Instead, it would prevent an abuse 
in the bargaining process, which is the ultimate aim of the 
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unconscionability doctrine.294 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit correctly denied EA’s anti-SLAPP motion, but left 
open many unanswered questions regarding the state of the NCAA waivers 
as a result of its holding. As a result, well-known student-athletes 
potentially may be able to successfully challenge the contracts.295  Even the 
average student-athlete can and should be able to successfully challenge the 
NCAA waivers.296  Where there is so little bargaining involved, it is simply 
unfair to enforce a contractual provision that potentially assigns the 
financial rights worth millions of dollars in exchange for a scholarship that 
is not guaranteed. 
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